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The AWGN Red Alert Problem
Bobak Nazer, Member, IEEE, Yanina Shkel, Graduate Student Member, IEEE, and Stark C. Draper, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Consider the following unequal error protection
scenario. One special message, dubbed the “red alert” message,
is required to have an extremely small probability of missed
detection. The remainder of the messages must keep their average
probability of error and probability of false alarm below a
certain threshold. The goal then is to design a codebook that
maximizes the error exponent of the red alert message while
ensuring that the average probability of error and probability of
false alarm go to zero as the blocklength goes to infinity. This
red alert exponent has previously been characterized for discrete
memoryless channels. This paper completely characterizes the
optimal red alert exponent for additive white Gaussian noise
channels with block power constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
Communication networks are increasingly being taxed by
the enormous demand for instantly available, streaming multi-
media. Ideally, we would like to maximize the reliability and
data rate of a system while simultaneously minimizing the
delay. Yet, in the classical fixed blocklength setting, the reli-
ability function of a code goes to zero as the rate approaches
capacity even in the presence of feedback. This seems to imply
that, close to capacity, it is impossible to keep delay low and
reliability high. However, this lesson is partially an artifact of
the block coding framework. The achievable tradeoff changes
in a streaming setting where all bits do not need to be decoded
by a fixed deadline, but rather, each individual bit must be
recovered after a certain delay. In this setting, the reliability
function measures how quickly the error probability on each
bit estimate decays as a function of the delay. Surprisingly,
the achievable error exponent can be quite large at capacity
if a noiseless feedback link is available and cleverly exploited
[1], [2].
The distinguishing feature of these streaming architectures
with feedback is the use of an ultra-reliable special codeword
that is transmitted to notify the decoder when it is about to
make an error. While this “red alert” codeword requires a
significant fraction of the decoding space to attain its very
large error exponent, the remaining “standard” codewords
merely need their error probability to vanish in the block-
length. One question that seems intimately connected to the
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streaming delay-reliability tradeoff is how large the red alert
error exponent can be made for a fixed blocklength codebook
of a given rate. Beyond this streaming motivation, the red
alert problem is also connected to certain sensor network
scenarios. For example, consider a setting where sensors must
send regular updates to the basestation using as little power
as possible, i.e., using the standard codewords. If an anomaly
is detected, the sensors are permitted to transmit at higher
power in order to alert the basestation with high reliability,
which corresponds to our red alert problem.
Prior work has characterized the red alert exponent for
discrete memoryless channels (DMCs) [3]–[5]. In this paper,
we determine the red alert exponent for point-to-point additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels that operate under
block power constraints on both the regular and red alert
messages. We derive matching upper and lower bounds on
the red alert exponent with a focus on the resulting high-
dimensional geometry of the decoding regions. Our code
construction can be viewed as a generalization of that used
in the discrete case.
A. Related Work
Previous studies on protecting a special message over a
DMC have relied on some variant of the following code
construction. First, designate the special codeword to be the
repetition of a particular input symbol. Then, generate a fixed
composition codebook at the desired rate. This composition is
chosen to place the “standard” codewords as far as possible
from the special codeword (as measured by the Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence between induced output distributions)
while still allocating each codeword a decoding region large
enough to ensure a vanishing probability of error. By construc-
tion, the rest of the space is given to the special codeword.
Early work by Kudryashov used this strategy to achieve very
high error exponents in the bit error setting under an expected
delay constraint [1].
In [3], Borade, Nakibog˘lu, and Zheng study “bit”-wise and
“message”-wise unequal error protection (UEP) problems and
error exponents. The red alert problem is a message-wise UEP
problem in which one message is special and the remaining
messages are standard. While [3] focuses on general DMCs
near capacity, Lemma 1 of that paper develops a general sharp
bound on the red alert exponent for DMCs at any rate below
capacity (both with and without feedback). Specializing to the
exponent achieved at capacity, let X denote the input alphabet,
{pY |X(·|x)}x∈X the channel transition matrix, and p∗Y (·) the
capacity-achieving output distribution of the DMC. Then, the
optimal red alert exponent at capacity is
EALERT(C) = max
x∈X
D(p∗Y (·)‖pY |X(·|x)) (1)
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where D(·‖·) is the KL divergence. We also mention recent
work by Nakibog˘lu et al. [5], [6] that considers the general-
ization where a strictly positive error exponent is required of
the standard messages.
For the binary symmetric channel (BSC), the optimal red
alert exponent has a simple and illustrative form. This expo-
nent can be inferred from the general expression in [3, Lemma
1] or via a direct proof due to Sahai and Draper [4] (which
appeared concurrently with the conference version [7] of [3]).
Let p denote the crossover probability of the BSC and q the
probability that a symbol in the codebook is a one. Then, the
optimal red alert exponent as a function of rate R < C for
the BSC is
EALERT(R) = max
hB(q∗p)−hB(p)≤R
D(q ∗ p‖p) (2)
where hB(p) = −p log p− (1 − p) log(1 − p), q ∗ p = p(1 −
q) + q(1− p), and D(p˜‖p) = p˜ log
(
p˜
p
)
+ (1− p˜) log
(
1−p˜
1−p
)
.
Csisza´r studied a related problem where multiple special
messages require higher reliability in [8]. Upper bounds for
multiple special messages with different priority levels were
also developed in [3]. In [9], Borade and Sanghavi examined
the red alert problem from a coding theoretic perspective. As
shown by Wang [10], similar issues arise in certain sparse
communication problems where the receiver must determine
whether a codeword was sent or the transmitter was silent.
The fundamental mechanism through which high red alert
exponents are achieved is a binary hypothesis test. By design-
ing the induced distributions at the output of the channel to be
far apart as measured by KL divergence, we can distinguish
whether the red alert or some standard codeword was sent. The
test threshold is biased to minimize the probability of missed
detection and is analyzed via an application of Stein’s Lemma.
This sort of biased hypothesis test occurs in numerous other
communication settings with feedback, such as [11]–[13] and,
as mentioned earlier, these codes are also used as a component
in streaming data systems (see, for instance, [1], [2], [14],
[15]). There is also a rich literature on the interplay between
hypothesis testing and information theory, which we cannot
do justice to here (see, for instance, [16]–[18]).
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
First, we mention some of our notational choices. We will
use boldface lowercase letters to denote column vectors, 0
to denote the all zeros vector, and 1 to denote the all ones
vector. Throughout the paper, the log function is taken to be
the natural logarithm and rate is measured in nats instead of
bits. We use ‖x‖ to denote the Euclidean norm of the vector
x.
Definition 1 (Messages): The transmitter has a message
w ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,M} that it wants to convey to the receiver.
One of the messages, w = 0, is a red alert message that will
be afforded extra error protection. We assume the red alert
message is chosen with some probability greater than 0 and
the remaining messages are chosen with equal probability.
Definition 2 (Encoder): The encoder E maps the message
w into a length-n real-valued codeword x for transmission
over the channel, E : {0, 1, 2, . . . ,M} → Rn. Let x(w)
denote the codeword used for message w and let C denote the
entire codebook, C = {x(0),x(1), . . . ,x(M)}. The codebook
must satisfy both an average block power constraint across
codewords,
1
M
M∑
w=1
‖x(w)‖2 ≤ nPavg . (3)
In addition, the red alert codeword must satisfy a less stringent
power constraint,
‖x(0)‖2 ≤ nPalert , (4)
for some Palert ≥ Pavg. The rate of the codebook is
R =
1
n
logM (5)
nats per channel use.
Remark 1: Note that our codebook average power con-
straint (3) is less strict that the usual block power constraint
‖x(w)‖2 ≤ nPavg. Our achievable scheme can be easily modi-
fied to meet this constraint using expurgation. Furthermore, our
red alert power constraint (4) is less strict than a peak power
constraint |xi(0)|2 ≤ Palert ∀i, where xi(0) denotes the ith
symbol of the red alert codeword. Our scheme sets the red alert
codeword to be x(0) = −√Palert1, which naturally satisfies a
peak power constraint. Therefore, our main results hold under
an average power constraint and peak power constraint as well.
Remark 2: We omit the red alert codeword from the average
block power constraint for the sake of simplicity. Another
possibility would be to consider only an average block power
constraint over both the standard and red alert codeword. This
would lead to two different tensions between maximizing the
red alert exponent and maximizing the rate. The first would be
the allocation of the decoding regions and the second would
be the allocation of power based on the probability of a red
alert message. By using two separate power constraints, we
can state our results in a simpler form that does not depend
on the red alert probability.
Definition 3 (Channel): The channel outputs the transmit-
ted vector, corrupted by independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) Gaussian noise:
y = x+ z (6)
where z ∼ N (0, NIn×n) for some noise variance N > 0.
Definition 4 (Decoder): The signal observed by the re-
ceiver is sent into a decoder which produces an estimate wˆ of
the transmitted message w, D : Rn → {0, 1, 2, . . . ,M}.
Definition 5 (Error Probability): We are concerned with
three quantities, the probability of missed detection of the red
alert message pMD, the probability of false alarm pFA, and the
average probability of error of all other messages pMSG:
pMD = P(wˆ 6= w|w = 0) (7)
pFA = P(wˆ = 0|w 6= 0) (8)
pMSG =
1
M
M∑
w=1
P(wˆ 6= w|w 6= 0, wˆ 6= 0) . (9)
Definition 6 (Error Exponent): We say that a red alert ex-
ponent of EALERT(R) is achievable if for every ǫ > 0 and n
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large enough, there exists a rate R encoder and a decoder such
that
− 1
n
log (pMD) > EALERT(R)− ǫ (10)
pFA < ǫ (11)
pMSG < ǫ . (12)
In other words, we would like the red alert codeword to have
as large an error exponent as possible while keeping the other
error probabilities small. The standard codewords do not need
to have a positive error exponent. Of course, the rate must be
lower than the AWGN capacity, R ≤ C, where
C ,
1
2
log
(
1 +
Pavg
N
)
. (13)
A. High-Dimensional Geometry
We now review some basic facts of high-dimensional ge-
ometry that will be useful in our analysis.
Let Bn(a, r) denote the n-dimensional ball centered at a ∈
R
n with radius r > 0. Recall that the volume of Bn(a, r) is
Vol (Bn(a, r)) = r
nπn/2
Γ
(
n
2 + 1
) (14)
where Γ(·) is the gamma function [19, Ch. 1, Eq. 16]. We
define Sn(a, r) to be the surface of Bn(a, r). Its surface area
(or, more precisely, the (n − 1)-dimensional volume of its
surface) is
Vol (Sn(a, r)) = nr
n−1πn/2
Γ
(
n
2 + 1
) (15)
[19, Ch. 1, Eq. 19]. The dimension of the Vol(·) function will
always be clear from the context. We also define
Tn(a, r1, r2) ,
{
x : r1 ≤ ‖x− a‖ ≤ r2
} (16)
to be the spherical shell centered at a from radius r1 to r2.
The angle between two n-dimensional vectors a and b is
∡(a,b) = cos−1
(
aTb
‖a‖‖b‖
)
(17)
where cos−1(·) takes values between 0 and π. Let Vn(a,b, θ)
denote the n-dimensional cone with its origin at a, its center
axis running from a to b, and of half-angle θ which takes val-
ues from 0 to π/2. The solid angle Ω(θ) of an n-dimensional
cone of half-angle θ is the fraction of surface area that it carves
out of an n-dimensional sphere,
Ω(θ) =
Vol
(
Vn(0,1, θ) ∩ Sn(0, r)
)
Vol
(Sn(0, r)) . (18)
Note that the solid angle is the same for any sphere radius
r > 0.
Lemma 1 (Shannon): The solid angle of a cone with half-
angle θ satisfies
Ω(θ) =
sinn θ√
2πn sin θ cos θ
(
1 +O
(
1
n
))
.
See the math leading up to Equation 28 in [20] for a proof.
III. MAIN RESULT
In the binary case, the simplest characterization of the
optimal codebook is a statistical one: the red alert codeword is
the zero vector and the remaining codewords are of a constant
composition. From one perspective, this can be visualized
as placing the red alert codeword in the “center” of the
space with the other codewords encircling it (see Figure 1).
This corresponds to choosing the red alert codeword to be
the all zeros (or all ones) vector. The standard codewords
are generated using the distribution that maximizes the KL
divergence between output distributions while still supporting
a rate R. While this two-dimensional illustration is quite useful
for understanding the binary case, it can be misleading in the
Gaussian case. Specifically, it suggests that we should place
the red alert codeword at the origin which turns out to be
suboptimal.
Fig. 1. For a BSC, we can visualize the red alert codeword (solid square)
sitting in the “center” of the codebook and the standard codewords (solid
circles) occupying a thin shell around it. While this illustration is generally
sufficient for developing the intuition behind the discrete case, it does not
capture the full story in the Gaussian case.
Another way of looking at the binary construction is to
visualize each fixed composition as a parallel (or circle of
constant latitude) on a sphere (see Figure 2). That is, the
code lives on the Hamming cube in n dimensions, which
can be imagined as a sphere by taking the all zeros and all
ones vectors as the two poles and specifying the parallels
by their Hamming weight. From this viewpoint, the binary
construction sets the red alert codeword to be one of the
poles and chooses the remaining codewords on the furthest
parallel that can support a codebook of rate R. This perspective
leads naturally to the right construction for the Gaussian case.
Essentially, the standard codewords are placed uniformly along
a constant parallel. This can be achieved by generating the
standard codewords using a capacity-achieving code with a
fraction α of the total power. The red alert codeword is placed
at the furthest limit of the red alert power constraint (e.g.,
at −√Palert1) and the standard codewords are offset in the
opposite direction (e.g., by √(1 − α)Pavg1). See Figure 3
for an illustration. In the high-dimensional limit, most of the
codewords will live on a parallel, thus mimicking the binary
construction. This scheme leads us to the optimal red alert
exponent.
Theorem 1: For an AWGN channel with red alert power
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Fig. 2. From an alternate viewpoint, we can visualize the red alert codeword
(solid square) sitting on the pole of a sphere and the standard codewords (solid
circles) on a parallel on the opposite hemisphere. Our code construction for
the Gaussian case is inspired by this picture. If the red alert power constraint
is larger than the average power constraint, the red alert codeword should be
placed on the sphere’s axis but off its the surface, directly above the pole.
constraint Palert, average power constraint Pavg, and rate R,
the optimal red alert exponent is
E(R) =
Palert + Pavg + 2
√
Palert(Pavg +N(1− e2R))
2N
−R .
We prove achievability in Lemma 7 and provide a matching
upper bound in Lemma 11.
In the conference version of this paper [21], we used a
different code construction that lead to a smaller achievable
red alert exponent. The codewords were generated uniformly
on the sphere of radius
√
nPavg and we only kept those that
fell within a cone of appropriate half-angle. This type of
construction turns out not to achieve as dense a packing as
the construction used in this paper. In Appendix D, we explore
the reasons why this occurs in the binary case. In Appendix
E, we state the achievable red alert exponent for the conical
construction.
√
nPalert
√
n(1− α)Pavg
√
n
(α
P
avg −
λ
)
Fig. 3. Red alert codebook construction. The red alert codeword (solid
square) is placed at −√Palert1 which takes it a distance
√
nPalert from the
origin (circle). The standard codewords (shaded region) are drawn i.i.d. ac-
cording to a Gaussian distribution with variance αPavg−λ. These codewords
are pushed away from the origin by an offset
√
(1− α)Pavg1 (dashed line).
IV. CODEBOOK CONSTRUCTION
Our codebook construction for C consists of the following
steps:
1) Choose ǫ > 0 so that R < C − ǫ.
2) The red alert codeword is placed at the boundary of the
red alert power constraint, x(0) = −√Palert 1.
3) Choose 0 < α ≤ 1 so that
R+ ǫ =
1
2
log
(
1 +
αPavg
N
)
(19)
and choose λ > 0 so that
R+
ǫ
2
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
αPavg − λ
N
)
. (20)
4) Draw enR codewords v(1), . . . ,v(enR) i.i.d. according
to a Gaussian distribution with mean zero and variance
αPavg − λ.
5) To each of these codewords, add an offset√
(1− α)Pavg 1 so that the transmitted codeword
for each message (other than w = 0) is
x(w) =
√
(1− α)Pavg 1+ v(w).
We will show that this procedure yields a random codebook
C whose false alarm probability and average probability of
error are both less than ǫ. Afterwards, we will characterize
the probability of missed detection for the red alert codeword.
This will in turn imply the existence of a good fixed codebook.
V. ACHIEVABILITY
In this section, we will show that the red alert error exponent
stated in Theorem 1 is achievable. We begin by stating useful
large deviations bounds that will play a role in both the proof
of the achievability and of the converse. Next, we show that
any standard codeword plus noise lies at a certain distance
from the red alert codeword with high probability. Afterwards,
we argue that, with high probability, any standard codeword
plus noise is contained in a cone of a certain half-angle that is
centered on the red alert codeword. By combining the distance
and angle bounds, we can constrain the decoding region for the
standard codewords to the intersection of a cone with a shell.
The remainder of Rn can thus be allocated to the decoding
region for the red alert codeword, for which we will bound
the resulting probability of a missed detection.
A. Large Deviations Bounds
Our upper and lower bounds on the probability of error
are proven by deriving bounds on the size and shape of the
decoding regions and then applying Crame´r’s Theorem to
get large deviations bounds. Define gX(a) to be the moment
generating function of a random variable X ,
gX(a) , E[e
aX ] , (21)
and IX(b) to be the Fenchel-Legendre transform [22, Defini-
tion 2.2.2] of log(gX(·)),
IX(b) , sup
a
[
ab− log(gX(a))
]
. (22)
Theorem 2 (Crame´r): Let Sn = 1n
∑
iXi be the normal-
ized sum of n i.i.d. variables X1, . . . , Xn with finite mean and
rate function IX(b). Then, for every closed subset F ⊂ R,
P(Sn ∈ F) ≤ 2 exp
(
− n inf
b∈F
IX(b)
)
, (23)
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and, for every open subset G ⊂ R,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logP(Sn ∈ G) ≥ − inf
b∈G
IX(b) . (24)
See, for instance, [22, Theorem 2.2.3] for a proof. We will be
particularly interested in how this bound applies to the length
of i.i.d. Gaussian vectors, which corresponds to setting the
Xi to be Chi-square random variables (with one degree of
freedom). The moment generating function for such random
variables is gX(a) = 1√1−2a which yields a rate function of
IX(b) =
1
2 (b− 1− log b).
B. Distance Bounds
The following lemma formalizes the notion that the squared
ℓ2-norm of an i.i.d. Gaussian vector concentrates sharply
around its variance. Thus, for large n, the decoding region
can be restricted to a thin spherical shell.
Lemma 2: Let z be a length-n vector with i.i.d. zero-mean
Gaussian entries of variance N . Then, for any β > 0,
P
(‖z‖2 ≥ nN(1 + β)) ≤ 2 exp(−n
2
(
β − log(1 + β)))
and, for any 0 < β < 1,
P
(‖z‖2 ≤ nN(1− β)) ≤ 2 exp(−n
2
(− β − log(1− β))) .
See Appendix A for the proof.
Recall that the Q-function returns the probability that a
scalar Gaussian random variable with mean zero and unit
variance is greater than or equal to t > 0,
Q(t) ,
1√
2π
∫ ∞
t
exp
(
− t
2
2
)
dx , (25)
and is upper bounded as
Q(t) <
1
2
exp
(
− t
2
2
)
.
The next lemma is about the well-known fact that an
i.i.d. Gaussian vector is approximately orthogonal to any fixed
vector.
Lemma 3: Let z be a length-n vector with i.i.d. zero-mean
Gaussian entries with variance N and let a be a length-n
vector with ‖a‖2 = nα for some fixed α > 0. Then, for any
δ > 0 and n large enough,
P
(|aT z| ≥ δ‖a‖2) < δ . (26)
See Appendix A for the proof.
In Figure 4, the codebook is illustrated from the perspective
of the origin. Using the above lemma, it can be shown that
all but a vanishing fraction of codewords have power close
to Pavg and are nearly orthogonal with respect to any fixed
vector. We now characterize how far away a codeword plus
noise is from the red alert codeword with high probability.
Lemma 4: For any δ > 0 and n large enough, the distance
from the red alert codeword to the codeword for a standard
message, w ∈ {1, 2, . . . , enR}, plus noise is at least L with
high probability,
P (‖ − x(0) + x(w) + z‖ ≥ L) > 1− δ (27)
L =
√
n
(
Palert + Pavg +N + 2
√
Palert(1− α)Pavg − λ− δ
)
.
}ǫ
√
nPavg
Fig. 4. From the perspective of the origin, most of the codewords are
concentrated in an ǫ-shell of power αPavg − λ that is offset away from the
origin with power (1 − α)Pavg . Thus, with high probability, any random
codeword meets the power constraint.
See Appendix A for the proof.
C. Angle Bounds
We now upper bound the n-dimensional angle between a
fixed vector and the same vector plus i.i.d. Gaussian noise.
Lemma 5: Let z be a length-n vector with i.i.d. zero-mean
Gaussian entries with variance N and let a be a length-n
vector with ‖a‖2 = nα for some fixed α > 0. For any δ > 0
and n large enough, the probability that the angle between a
and a+ z exceeds cos−1
(√
α
α+N
)
+ δ is upper bounded by
δ,
P
(
∡(a, a+ z) ≥ cos−1
(√
α
α+N
)
+ δ
)
< δ . (28)
See Appendix B for the proof.
In Figure 5, we have depicted the distance L and the angle ψ
from the red alert codeword to a standard codeword plus noise.
Notice that both the noise and the codewords are (nearly)
orthogonal to the axis along which the red alert codeword
lies.
Now consider a cone centered on the red alert codeword that
contains a standard codeword plus noise with high probability.
The next lemma upper bounds the required half-angle for the
cone.
Lemma 6: Let Vn(x(0),0, ψ) denote the cone centered on
the red alert codeword with axis running towards the origin
and half-angle ψ. For any δ > 0, w ∈ {1, 2, . . . , enR}, and n
TO APPEAR IEEE TRANS. INFO. THEORY. 6
L
ψ
Fig. 5. With high probability, a Gaussian codeword, a Gaussian noise vector,
and the red alert codeword vector are all nearly orthogonal to each other.
Conditioning on this event, we can derive the minimum distance L and the
angle ψ between a codeword plus noise and the red alert codeword.
large enough, if the half-angle ψ is greater than or equal to
sin−1
(√
αPavg +N − λ
Palert + Pavg + 2
√
Palert(1− α)Pavg +N − λ
)
+ δ
then the cone contains the codeword for message w plus noise
with high probability, i.e.,
P
(
x(w) + z ∈ Vn
(
x(0),0, ψ
))
> 1− δ . (29)
See Appendix B for the proof.
D. Red Alert Exponent
Now that we know the decoding region can be confined to a
conical shell, we can bound the probability of missed detection
for the red alert codeword.
Lemma 7: For any rate R, the following red alert exponent
is achievable
E(R) =
Palert + Pavg + 2
√
Palert(Pavg +N(1− e2R))
2N
−R .
Proof: Choose δ > 0. In Lemma 4, L is a lower bound
on the distance between the red alert codeword and a standard
codeword plus noise. From Lemma 6, we have an upper bound
on the half-angle needed to capture a standard codeword plus
noise in the cone Vn(x(0),0, ψ) centered on the red alert
codeword. If the received vector lies in the cone and is at
least distance L from the red alert codeword, then the decoder
assumes the red alert message was not transmitted. Otherwise,
it declares that the red alert message was sent. For n large
enough, we know that the probability that a random codeword
plus noise, x(w)+z, leaves this region is at most ǫ. Therefore,
the probability of false alarm (averaged over the randomness
in the codebook) is upper bounded by ǫ.
If the received vector falls in the decoding region for stan-
dard messages, we simply subtract the offset
√
(1− α)Pavg1
and apply a maximum likelihood decoder to make an estimate
of the transmitted message. Since the rate of the codebook
is chosen to be slightly less than the capacity (for the power
level αPavg−λ), it is straightforward to show that the average
probability of error for a given message is at most ǫ.
Since the average false alarm probability and average error
probability are small, it follows that there exists at least
one fixed codebook with a small false alarm probability and
average error probability. We now turn to upper bounding the
probability of missed detection. Assume the red alert codeword
is transmitted. Define
β =
Palert + Pavg + 2
√
Palert(1− α)Pavg − λ− δ
N
. (30)
where λ is specified by step 3) of the codebook construction
in Section IV. Using Lemma 2, the probability that the noise
pushes the red alert codeword further than L (as specified in
Lemma 4) can be upper bounded by
P
(‖x(0) + z‖ > L) = P(‖x(0) + z‖2 > nN(1 + β)) (31)
≤ exp
(
−n
2
(
β − log(1 + β))) . (32)
The probability that the received vector falls into the cone
of half-angle ψ is given by the fraction of surface area of a
sphere carved out by the cone. Using Lemma 1, this can be
calculated as
P
(
x(0) + z ∈ Vn
(
x(0),0, ψ
))
=
sinn ψ√
2πn sinψ cosψ
(
1 +O
(
1
n
))
. (33)
Pulling terms into the exponent we get
exp
(
− n
(
− log ( sinψ)+ 1
n
log
(√
2πn sinψ cosψ
)
+O (1/n)
))
. (34)
For n large enough, we get that the probability is upper
bounded by exp
(
− n(− log(sinψ)− δ)).
Since the noise is an i.i.d. Gaussian vector, its magnitude
and direction are independent. Therefore, the probability of
missed detection is upper bounded as
pMD = P
(‖x(0) + z‖ > L) P(x(0) + z ∈ Vn(x(0),0, ψ))
≤ exp
(
−n
2
(
β − log(1 + β)− 2 log(sinψ)− 2δ
))
for n large enough. For λ and δ small enough and n large
enough, the exponent β2 − 12 log(1 + β) − log(sinψ)− δ can
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be made equal to
Palert + Pavg + 2
√
Palert(1− α)Pavg
2N
− 1
2
log
(
Palert + Pavg + 2
√
Palert(1 − α)Pavg +N
N
)
+
1
2
log
(
Palert + Pavg + 2
√
Palert(1 − α)Pavg +N
αPavg +N
)
− ǫ
=
Palert + Pavg + 2
√
Palert(1 − α)Pavg
2N
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
αPavg
N
)
− ǫ
=
Palert + Pavg + 2
√
Palert(1 − α)Pavg
2N
−R− ǫ .
Finally, we can solve for α in terms of R to get α =
N
Pavg
(e2R−1). Substituting this into the expression above yields
the desired result.
Note that at R = 0, the coherent gain
2
√
Palert(Pavg +N(1− e2R)) = 2
√
PalertPavg, which is
the largest benefit we could hope for. At R = C, the coherent
gain vanishes.
Remark 3: We can interpret our achievability result from a
hypothesis testing perspective. Let H0 denote the event that
a standard codeword is transmitted and let H1 denote the
event that the red alert codeword is transmitted. Under H0, the
entries of y are i.i.d. according to a Gaussian distribution with
mean
√
(1− α)Pavg and variance αPavg +N . Under H1, the
entries are i.i.d. Gaussian with mean −√Palert and variance
N . Using the Chernoff-Stein Lemma [23, Theorem 11.8.3],
we can bound the missed detection probability of the optimal
hypothesis test via the KL divergence between the two distri-
butions, D
(N (√(1− α)Pavg, αPavg +N)∥∥N (−√Palert, N)).
A bit of calculation will reveal that this KL divergence
corresponds exactly to the red alert exponent. One can obtain
the same exponent by plugging these distributions into the red
alert exponent expression from [3, Lemma 1]. However, this
does not in itself constitute a proof as the results of [3] are
for DMCs without cost constraints.
VI. CONVERSE
We now develop an upper bound on the red alert exponent.
Our bound relies on the fact that, in order to recover the stan-
dard messages reliably, we must allocate a significant volume
of the output space for decoding them, which contributes to
the probability of missed detection. An overview of the main
steps in the proof is provided below.
• In Lemma 8, we argue that a constant fraction of the
codewords live in a thin shell and strictly satisfy the
power and error constraints.
• With high probability, the standard codewords plus noise
are concentrated in a thin shell. Lemma 9 establishes this
fact as well as the minimum volume required for the
decoding region to attain a given probability of error.
• To minimize the probability of missed detection, we
should pack this volume into the thin shell to maximize
the distance from the red alert codeword (see Figure 6 for
an illustration). Lemma 10 bounds the distance and angle
from the red alert codeword to the resulting decoding
region (see Figure 7 for an illustration).
• Finally, in Lemma 11, we bound the probability that the
noise carries the red alert codeword into the decoding
region for the standard codewords.
Lemma 8: Assume that a sequence of codebooks satisfies
the average block power constraint Pavg and has average
probability of error pMSG that tends to zero. Then for any
γ > 0 and n large enough, there exists a shell of width γ that
contains en(R−γ) codewords, each with probability of error at
most (2/γ)pMSG, and average power at most Pavg(1− γ)−1.
See Appendix C for the proof.
Lemma 9: Assume that, for some γ, ρ > 0, en(R−γ)
codewords, each with probability of error at most
(2/γ)pMSG lie in the shell Tn(0,√nρ,√nρ + γ). Then,
for n large enough, the decoding region for these
codewords must include a subset of the noise-inflated
shell Tn
(
0,
√
n(ρ+N − γ),√n(ρ+N + γ)) with volume
at least
VMIN = e
n(R−γ) (nπ(N − γ))n/2
Γ
(
n
2 + 1
) .
See Appendix C for the proof.
Lemma 10: Assume that a sequence of codebooks has rate
R and an average probability of error pMSG that tends to zero as
n increases. Then, for sufficiently small ǫ and n large enough,
the probability of missed detection pMD is lower bounded by
the probability that the noise vector has squared norm ‖z‖2
between L2 + nǫ and L2 + 2nǫ and lies at an angle ∡(z,1)
between ψ(1 − ǫ) and ψ(1− 2ǫ) where
L2 = n
(
Palert + Pavg +N + 2
√
Palert
(
Pavg +N(1− e2R)
))
ψ =
√
Ne2R
Palert + Pavg +N + 2
√
Palert(Pavg +N(1− e2R))
.
Proof: Consider the standard codewords from a red
alert codebook. From Lemma 8, for any γ > 0 and
n large enough, at least en(R−γ) codewords with power
at most Pavg(1 − γ)−1 and probability of error at most
(2/γ)pMSG must lie in a shell Tn(0,√nρ,√nρ + γ) for
some ρ > 0. From Lemma 9, it follows that the decoding
region for these codewords falls within the noise-inflated shell
Tn
(
0,
√
n(ρ+N − γ),√n(ρ+N + γ)) and has volume at
least VMIN.
To get our lower bound, we need to pack this volume in
the noise-inflated shell such that it minimizes pMD. Since the
noise vector is i.i.d. Gaussian, the probability that the red alert
codeword is pushed to a certain point is determined solely by
a decreasing function of the distance. Let Gd denote the set of
all points at distance d or greater from the red alert codeword
Gd = {z : ‖z− x(0)‖ ≥ d} . (35)
The optimal volume packing corresponds to the intersection
of the set Gd and the noise shell
Tn
(
0,
√
n(ρ+N − ν),√n(ρ+N + ν)) with d chosen such
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Red Alert
Codeword
d R
Gd
Noise-Inflated Shell
Fig. 6. To attain the desired probability of error, the decoding region for
the standard codewords must include a subset of the noise-inflated shell with
volume at least VMIN . To minimize the probability of missed detection, we
place this volume as far from the red alert codeword (square) as possible.
Let Gd denote the set of points at distance d or greater from the red alert
codeword. The decoding region R is the intersection of Gd and the shell,
where d is chosen to capture volume VMIN.
that the volume of the set is equal to VMIN. Let R denote the
resulting region and see Figure 6 for an illustration.
Let REDGE denote the set of points in R that sit at the
minimum distance to the red alert codeword,
REDGE =
{
u ∈ R : ‖u− x(0)‖ = min
w∈R
‖w− x(0)‖
}
,
and let v∗ ∈ REDGE be any of these points. Let L∗ and ψ∗
denote the distance and angle from the red alert codeword
x(0) to v∗. We now seek to bound these quantities through a
bound on the angle from the origin to v∗.
Let θ∗ denote the half-angle of a cone, centered on the
origin that contains the region R (and thus includes v∗). The
volume of this cone must be at least equal to that of R since R
is a subset of the noise shell. Therefore, θ∗ is lower bounded
by the half-angle θ of a cone whose volume is equal to the
volume of R (see Figure 7 for an illustration). Combining (14)
and Lemma 1, for n large enough, the volume of this cone is
upper bounded by
(nπ(ρ+N + ν) sin2 θ)n/2
Γ
(
n
2 + 1
) . (36)
Now, since we require this quantity to exceed VMIN, we can
lower bound θ by
θ ≥ sin−1
(
eR−ν
√
N − ν
ρ+N + ν
)
. (37)
We can further lower bound θ by setting ρ to its maximum
value Pavg(1− γ)−1,
θ ≥ sin−1
(
eR−ν
√
N − ν
Pavg(1 − γ)−1 +N + ν
)
. (38)
ψ θ
L
√ n
(ρ
+
N
+
ν
)
v∗
v
R
Fig. 7. Illustration of successive lower bounds on the probability of missed
detection, pMD. The red alert codeword is represented by a square and the
origin by a circle. The decoding region R is denoted by a thick line. We
would like to characterize the distance L∗ and angle ψ∗ to the edge of R,
represented by the point v∗. To do so, we consider a cone with half-angle
θ (shaded region) with the same volume as R. The intersection of this cone
with the outer surface of R contains a point v at distance L > L∗ and
angle ψ < ψ∗ . In our final lower bound, we only consider the event that
the received vector lies in the subset of R at distance slightly larger than L
and within an angle between ψ − ǫ to ψ − 2ǫ from the red alert codeword
(illustrated by dark patches).
Thus, for any δ > 0, ν and γ small enough, and n large
enough, θ∗ is lower bounded as follows
θ∗ ≥ θ ≥ sin−1
(
eR−δ
√
N
Pavg +N
)
. (39)
The distance L∗ from x(0) to v∗ is upper bounded by the
distance L to a point v that lies on the intersection of the
outer shell (at distance √n(Pavg(1 − γ)−1 +N + ν) from the
origin) and the cone of half-angle θ. Without loss of generality,
assume that the red alert codeword is placed at x(0) = −µ1
for some µ > 0.1 The direction of the red alert codeword is
not important since we will always fill the noise shell relative
to this direction. Then L2 is at least(√
nµ+ cos θ
√
n(Pavg(1− γ)−1 +N + ν)
)2
+
(
sin θ
√
n(Pavg(1− γ)−1 +N + ν)
)2
. (40)
For any δ > 0, γ and ν small enough, and n large enough,
this quantity is itself upper bounded by
n
(
µ+ Pavg +N + 2 cos θ
√
µ(Pavg +N) + δ
)
.
The half-angle ψ of a cone, centered on the red alert
codeword, that contains the point v is lower bounded by
sin−1

 sin θ√n(Pavg(1− γ)−1 +N + ν)√
n
(
µ+ Pavg +N + 2 cos θ
√
µ(Pavg +N) + δ
)


1It is straightforward to prove that placing the red alert codeword exactly
at the origin is suboptimal.
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which, for any η > 0, γ, ν, and δ small enough, and n large
enough is itself lower bounded by
sin−1

 (1− η) sin θ√Pavg +N√
µ+ Pavg +N + 2 cos θ
√
µ(Pavg +N)

 .
The probability of missed detection decreases if the distance
L∗ from x(0) to v∗ is increased. The angle ψ∗ will simul-
taneously decrease. Thus, by setting µ = Palert, we further
lower bound the probability of missed detection. Using the
relation sin2 θ + cos2 θ = 1 combined with (39), we find that
cos θ ≤
√
1− e2R−2δ NN+Pavg . Plugging in µ and θ, we obtain
the following upper bound on (L∗)2:
n
(
Palert + Pavg +N + 2
√
Palert(Pavg +N(1− e2R−2δ)) + δ
)
and the following lower bound on ψ∗:
sin−1
√
(1 − η)2Ne2R−2δ
Palert + Pavg +N + 2
√
Palert(Pavg +N(1− e2R−2δ))
Finally, it follows that, for ǫ small enough (but greater than 0
for finite n) and n large enough, the optimal packing contains
all points from squared distance L2 + nǫ to L2 + 2nǫ from
the red alert codeword and angle ψ(1− ǫ) to ψ(1− 2ǫ) where
L and ψ are as in the statement of the theorem. Thus, the
probability of missed detection is lower bounded by the event
that the noise falls into this region.
Lemma 11: For any rate R, the red alert exponent is upper
bounded by
E(R) ≤ Palert + Pavg + 2
√
Palert(Pavg +N(1− e2R))
2N
−R .
Proof: Lemma 10 established that the probability of
missed detection is lower bounded by the event that the noise
has squared length between L2 + nǫ to L2 + 2nǫ and angle
between ψ(1 − ǫ) and ψ(1 − 2ǫ) for some ǫ that tends to 0
as n tends to infinity. We now lower bound the probability of
this event. Define
β =
Palert + Pavg + 2
√
Palert(Pavg +N(1− e2R))
N
. (41)
Since the magnitude and angle of an i.i.d. Gaussian vector
are independent, the probability of missed detection is lower
bounded as follows:
pMD ≥ P
(
L2 + nǫ ≤ ‖z‖2 ≤ L2 + 2nǫ)
· P
(
z ∈ {Vn(0,1, ψ(1− ǫ)) \ Vn(0,1, ψ(1− 2ǫ))})
By Lemma 1, for n large enough, the second term in the
product can be lower bounded by(
sin(ψ(1− ǫ)2))n − ( sin(ψ(1 − 2ǫ)))n (42)
which, for n large enough, is itself lower bounded by(
(1− ǫ)3 sin(ψ(1 − ǫ)))n (43)
= exp
(
− n(− log ((1− ǫ)3 sin(ψ(1 − ǫ)))) . (44)
Now, substituting in the lower bound on ψ from Lemma 10,
we arrive at the following lower bound
exp
(
− n
(
−R + 1
2
log(1 + β)− 3 log(1− ǫ)
))
. (45)
Using the upper bound on L from Lemma 10 and applying
Theorem 2 for Chi-square random variables (and noting that
ǫ and ν go to zero as n goes to infinity), it follows that
lim inf
n→∞
(
− 1
n
logP
(
L2 + nǫ ≤ ‖z‖2 ≤ L2 + 2nǫ)) (46)
≥ β
2
− 1
2
log(1 + β) . (47)
Combining this with the lower bound on the angle event in
(45), the exponent of the probability of missed detection is
lower bounded by
lim inf
n→∞
(
− 1
n
log pMD
)
(48)
≥ β
2
− 1
2
log(1 + β) +
1
2
log(1 + β)−R (49)
=
Palert + Pavg + 2
√
Palert(Pavg +N(1− e2R))
2N
−R
as desired.
VII. PLOTS
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Fig. 8. Optimal red alert exponent for Pavg = −5dB with Palert =
Pavg, 2Pavg, 3Pavg . An upper bound on the point-to-point AWGN error
exponent is provided for comparison.
In Figures 8 and 9, we have plotted the optimal red alert
exponent for Pavg = −5dB and Pavg = 15dB, respectively,
with red alert power constraints Palert = Pavg, 2Pavg, and 3Pavg.
For comparison, we have also plotted an upper bound on the
AWGN point-to-point error exponent from [20, Equation 4].
Notice that the red alert exponent can be quite large at capacity,
even when the red alert power constraint is equal to the average
power constraint.
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Fig. 9. Optimal red alert exponent for Pavg = 15dB with Palert =
Pavg, 2Pavg, 3Pavg. An upper bound on the point-to-point AWGN error
exponent is provided for comparison.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed sharp bounds on the error exponent for
distinguishing a single special message from 2nR standard
messages over an AWGN channel. As discussed in the intro-
duction, these bounds can be used to characterize the perfor-
mance of certain data streaming architectures, where each bit
must be decoded after a given delay. An interesting question
for future study is how well a single special message can be
protected at a given finite blocklength, i.e., understanding the
limits of unequal error protection in the non-asymptotic regime
[24].
APPENDIX A
PROOFS FOR SECTION V-B
Proof of Lemma 2: The squared Euclidean distance is
the sum of n i.i.d. squared Gaussian random variables with
variance N . Therefore, 1nN ‖z‖2 is the sum of n i.i.d. Chi-
square random variables. Applying Theorem 2 and plugging
in the Chi-square rate function of IZ(b) = 12 (b− 1− log b), it
follows that
P
(‖z‖2 ≥ nNb) ≤ 2 exp(−n
2
(b− 1− log b)
)
. (50)
Substituting in b = 1+β yields the first bound and b = 1−β
yields the second.
Proof of Lemma 3: First, we write the probability that
|aT z| is greater than t in terms of the Q-function,
P
(|aT z| ≥ t) = 2Q( t√
N‖a‖
)
(51)
< exp
(
− t
2
2N‖a‖2
)
. (52)
Substituting t = δ‖a‖2 yields,
P
(|aT z| ≥ δ‖a‖2) < exp(−δ2nα
2N
)
, (53)
which can be driven arbitrarily close to zero for n large
enough.
Proof of Lemma 4: We simply wish to bound the
length of the vector from the special codeword to a standard
codeword plus noise, −x(0)+x(w)+z. By expanding terms,
we obtain:
‖ − x(0) + x(w) + z‖2 (54)
=
∥∥∥∥
(√
Palert +
√
(1 − α)Pavg
)
1+ v(w) + z
∥∥∥∥
2
(55)
=
(√
Palert +
√
(1 − α)Pavg
)2
1T1
+ 2
(√
Palert +
√
(1− α)Pavg
)
1T (v(w) + z)
+ ‖v(w) + z‖2 . (56)
The first term is n(Palert +(1−α)Pavg +2
√
Palert(1− α)Pavg.
The second term is the inner product of a fixed vector
2
(√
Palert +
√
(1− α)Pavg
)
1 and an i.i.d. Gaussian vector
v(w) + z since v(w) is an element of a random Gaussian
codebook. Thus, using Lemma 3, it can be shown that the
probability that this inner product is less than −nδ/2 is at
most δ/2 for n large enough. The third term is the squared
norm of an i.i.d. Gaussian vector with mean zero and variance
αPavg +N−λ. From Lemma 2, it follows that ‖v(w)+z‖2 is
less than n(αPavg+N−λ−δ/2) with probability at most δ/2
for n large enough. Combining these three bounds completes
the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOFS FOR SECTION V-C
Proof of Lemma 5: The angle between a and a+ z is
∡(a, a+ z) = cos−1
(
aT (a+ z)
‖a‖‖a+ z‖
)
. (57)
From Lemma 3, for any ν > 0 and n large enough, the
probability that aT z > ν‖a‖2 is at most ν. Therefore, since
‖a‖ = nα we have that aT (a + z) ≥ (1 + ν)nα with
probability at most ν. Combining Lemmas 2 and 3, we can also
show that the probability that ‖a+ z‖ < (1− ν)√n(α+N)
is at most ν for n large enough. Thus, the probability that
aT (a+ z)
‖a‖‖a+ z‖ <
(1 + ν)nα√
nα(1− ν)√n(α+N) (58)
=
1 + ν
1− ν
√
α
α+N
(59)
is at most 2ν. Choosing ν small enough yields the desired
result.
Proof of Lemma 6: The angle between the axis of the
cone and the standard codeword plus noise is
∡(−x(0),−x(0) + x(w) + z) = cos−1 (u) (60)
u =
(−x(0))T (−x(0) + x(w) + z)
‖x(0)‖‖ − x(0) + x(w) + z‖ . (61)
Since cos−1(u) is a decreasing function of u, an upper bound
on the angle can be obtained by lower bounding u. We will do
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this by lower bounding the numerator and upper bounding the
denominator (with high probability). Expanding the numerator
yields:
(−x(0))T (−x(0) + x(w) + z) (62)
=
√
Palert
(√
Palert +
√
(1− α)Pavg
)
1T1 (63)
+
√
Palert 1
T (v(w) + z) . (64)
The first term is simply n
√
Palert
(√
Palert +
√
(1− α)Pavg
)
.
The second term is the inner product of a fixed vector and an
i.i.d. Gaussian vector. Thus, using Lemma 3, it can be shown
that for any ν > 0 and n large enough, the probability that the
second term is less than −νn is at most ν. The denominator is
composed of two terms. The first is simply ‖x(0)‖ = √nPalert.
Following the proof of Lemma 4, it can be shown that the
second term ‖ − x(0) + x(w) + z‖ is greater than√
n
(
Palert + Pavg +N + 2
√
Palert(1− α)Pavg − λ+ ν
)
with probability at most ν. Combining these bounds, we get
that the probability that u is less than
√
Palert +
√
(1− α)Pavg − ν√
Palert + Pavg +N + 2
√
Palert(1− α)Pavg − λ+ ν
(65)
with probability at most 2ν. Thus, so long as the half-angle
ψ is greater than or equal to
cos−1
( √
Palert +
√
(1− α)Pavg√
Palert + Pavg + 2
√
Palert(1− α)Pavg +N − λ
)
+ δ
the cone contains x(w)+z with probability at least 1−δ for n
large enough. Applying the trigonometric identity sin2(ψ) +
cos2(ψ) = 1 completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOFS FOR SECTION VI
Proof of Lemma 8: Observe that at least one codeword
has power at most Pavg, otherwise the average will be larger
than Pavg. If we remove this codeword’s contribution from
the average, the remaining codewords have average power
at most Pavg e
nR
enR−1 . Now, we can find a codeword whose
power must be at most Pavg e
nR
enR−1 . Removing this codeword
yields an average of Pavg e
nR
enR−2 . Continuing this process,
we can remove γenR codewords that each have power at
most Pavg(1 − γ)−1. By the same argument, we can find
(1− (γ/2))enR codewords that each have probability of error
at most (2/γ)pMSG. Therefore, at least (γ/2)enR codewords
must satisfy both these constraints simultaneously.
The selected codewords live in the sphere of radius√
nPavg(1− γ)−1. We partition this sphere into shells of
width γ each. It follows that at least one of these shells
must contain γ
2
2
√
n(Pavg(1−γ)−1)
enR codewords. Finally, select
n large enough so that en(R−γ) ≤ γ2
2
√
n(Pavg(1−γ)−1)
enR.
Proof of Lemma 9: Assume that one of the codewords
from the shell Tn(0,√nρ,√nρ+ γ) is transmitted. It follows
from Lemma 2, that for any γ > 0 and n large enough,
the probability that ‖y‖ is larger than √n(ρ+N + γ) or
smaller than
√
n(ρ+N − γ) is upper bounded by pMSG 1γ . If
the noise lands outside this “noise shell,” then we will assume
that the transmitted codeword is decoded correctly. However,
each codeword still needs to capture 1 − pMSG 3γ probability
inside the shell to ensure the error probability does not exceed
pMSG
2
γ .
Now, consider the volume required for decoding a single
codeword reliably. Since the noise is i.i.d. Gaussian, its
probability distribution is rotationally invariant. This implies
that the shape that uses the least volume to capture a given
probability of error is a sphere centered on the codeword. Let√
nν be the radius of this sphere. By Lemma 2, if ν < N , the
probability that the noise falls inside this sphere goes to zero
exponentially in n which implies the probability of error goes
to one. Therefore, for n large enough, the probability of error
will always exceed the desired probability of error (which is
assumed to be bounded away from one). Using (14), we get
that the decoding region of each codeword must have volume
at least (nπ(N−γ))
n/2
Γ(n
2
+1)
for any γ > 0. We find that we will
need a volume of at least
VMIN = e
n(R−γ) (nπ(N − γ))n/2
Γ
(
n
2 + 1
) (66)
to reliably decode these codewords.
APPENDIX D
OFFSET CODES VERSUS CONICAL CODES
We now develop some intuition for why the offset construc-
tion of Section IV is a better construction than the conical
construction we used in our earlier work [21]. The difference
between these two constructions is easier to understand in a
discrete setting so we will analyze the corresponding con-
structions for a BSC with crossover probability p. For ease of
analysis, we will calculate rate in bits per channel use (rather
than nats per channel use).
First, recall that the BSC red alert exponent can be attained
using a fixed composition codebook. Specifically, each of the
2nR codewords is drawn independently and uniformly from
the set of weight-nq binary sequences. If the rate is less than
the induced mutual information, the average probability of
error can be driven to zero
R < I(X ;Y ) = hB(q ∗ p)− hB(p) . (67)
The red alert codeword is taken to be all the all zeros vector.
The decoder runs a hypothesis test between the two possible
output distributions, Bernoulli(p) and Bernoulli(q ∗ p). The
error exponent for the probability of missed detection is the
KL divergence between the two distributions, D(q ∗ p‖p). As
shown in [4], this is the optimal red alert exponent.
We can construct a conical code of parameter q > 1/2
by first drawing 2n(C−ǫ) codewords i.i.d. according to a
Bernoulli(1/2) distribution for some ǫ > 0. Let C denote
the resulting set of codewords. To guarantee the same red
alert exponent, we only keep those codewords with Hamming
weight nq or greater and set the red alert codeword to be the
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all zeros vector. We now bound the rate of this construction.
Using Theorem 2, it can be shown that the probability that a
Bernoulli(1/2) sequence x has Hamming weight at least nq
is upper bounded as
P(wt(x) ≥ nq) ≤ 2−nD(q‖0.5) . (68)
Take Cq to be the set of subset of codewords in C with
Hamming weight nq or greater. Using (68), the expected size
of Cq is upper bounded by
E
[|Cq|] ≤ 2n(C−D(q‖0.5)−ǫ) (69)
= 2n(1−hB(p)−(1−hB(q))−ǫ) (70)
= 2n(hB(q)−hB(p)−ǫ) . (71)
It can be shown with a Chernoff bound that the probability
Cq contains significantly more codewords vanishes doubly
exponentially in n. Furthermore, it can be shown that the
average probability of error of Cq vanishes with n. Therefore,
the rate of the conical codebook is hB(q) − hB(p) for a red
alert exponent of D(q ∗ p‖p).
Now, observe that q < q ∗ p < 1/2 (unless either q or p
is equal to 1/2) so hB(q) < hB(q ∗ p), meaning that the rate
of the conical construction is strictly less than the (optimal)
constant composition construction. Intuitively, this means that
the usual i.i.d. Bernoulli(12 ) construction used to approach
capacity does not pack codewords of higher (or lower) weights
efficiently. Constraining the weight of codewords is essential
to the hypothesis test that leads to the red alert exponent.
The constant composition (or offset) construction is successful
since it optimizes the packing of codewords of a given weight.
A similar phenomenon occurs in the AWGN setting as shown
below.
APPENDIX E
AWGN CONICAL CODES: RED ALERT EXPONENT
For completeness, we review the AWGN conical code that
we proposed in [21] and the resulting red alert exponent. The
construction is comprised of three main steps:
1) Place the red alert codeword at the limit of the red alert
power constraint, x(0) = −√Palert1.
2) Draw 2n(C−ǫ) codewords i.i.d. according to a Gaussian
distribution with mean 0 and variance Pavg − ǫ.
3) Of these codewords, only keep the first 2nR that lie in
the cone Vn(0,1, θ + ǫ) where θ = sin−1
(
e−(C−R)
)
.
(If there are fewer than 2nR such codewords, declare an
error.)
It can be shown that with high probability the resulting
codebook contains 2nR codewords inside the cone of half-
angle θ. We now turn to bounding the distance and angle from
the standard decoding region to the red alert codeword.
The distance can be bounded using the techniques used to
prove Lemma 4. It follows that for any δ > 0 and n large
enough, the squared distance from the red alert codeword
to a standard codeword plus noise is at least L with high
probability,
P
(‖ − x(0) + x(w) + z‖ ≥ L) > 1− δ (72)
L2 = n
(
Palert + Pavg + 2
√
PalertPavg cos θ +N − δ
)
. (73)
Substituting in cos2 θ = 1 − sin2 θ = 1 − e−2(C−R), we get
that L2 is equal to
n
(
Palert + Pavg +N + 2
√
PalertPavg
(
1− e−2(C−R))− δ) .
Similarly, the techniques from Lemma 6 can be used to
bound the angle. Let Vn(x(0),0, ψ) denote the cone centered
on the red alert codeword with axis running towards the origin
and half-angle ψ. For any δ > 0 and n large enough, if the
half-angle ψ is larger than
sin−1

 e
−(C−R)√Pavg√
Palert + Pavg +N + 2
√
PalertPavg
(
1− e−2(C−R))


then the cone contains the codeword for message w plus noise
with high probability, i.e.,
P
(
x(w) + z ∈ Vn(x(0),0, ψ)
)
> 1− δ . (74)
Finally, these two bounds can be combined, as in the proof
of Lemma 7, to get an an achievable red alert exponent2 of
EALERT =
Palert + Pavg + 2
√
PalertPavg(1− e−2(C−R))
2N
+
1
2
log
(
Pavg +N
Pavg
)
−R . (75)
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Fig. 10. Comparison of the red alert exponent attained by an (optimal) offset
code construction and a conical code construction with an average power
constraint of 0, 5, and 10dB with Palert = 2Pavg.
In Figure 10, we have plotted this red alert exponent
alongside the optimal one derived via the offset construction
for average power constaints Pavg = 0, 5, and 10dB with
Palert = 2Pavg.
2Note that this is an improvement over the error exponent reported in
Theorem 1 of [21] since we have used tighter upper bounds. Specifically,
in [21], we did not completely take advantage of the fact that both the noise
and the standard codewords are nearly orthogonal to any fixed vector and to
each other with high probability.
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